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1Left Behind
End Times for a Media History Paradigm
Carolyn Marvin
ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the work of  the media “structuralists” of  the so-called 
Canadian or Toronto school of  media studies: Harold Adams Innis, Marshall 
McLuhan, and Walter J. Ong, especially. Their work is placed within its histori-
cal context, both in terms of  scholarly ancestry and in terms of  its reception 
in North American universities and especially in schools of  journalism. A criti-
cal assessment of  the work of  these scholars as media history is offered, rec-
ognizing its shortcomings as historical narrative but also its appeal as a way of  
understanding the influence of  media forms.
What makes us who we are? Class struggle? The disenchantment of  the world? Do 
we owe our ways of  being in the world to the family romance, the wheeling zodiac? 
How about the selfish gene, birth order, guns, germs and steel, patriarchy, the internal 
combustion engine, original sin, the scientific method? Is it the particular way that 
media technologies frame the social environment and organize our relationships to 
one another? Anyone inclined toward this last idea will recall a line of  argument from 
the 1960s Marshall McLuhan for a while hijacked what might be called thinking 
popular culture with a high-concept take on the generational explosion of  the 1960s 
– its energy, its music, its civil rights, its sexual openness, its advertising, its counter-
culture, its antiwar volume.
The International Encyclopedia of  Media Studies, First Edition. 
General Editor Angharad N. Valdivia.
Volume I: Media History and the Foundations of  Media Studies. Edited by John Nerone.
© 2013 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2013 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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The ore McLuhan proposed to mine to uncover society’s deep structure was televi-
sion, rabbit ears cocked to the cultural sun and overdue for a vision more arresting 
and certainly more entertaining than the wasteland talk of  establishment discourse. 
Behind television’s ephemeral, culture-clucking content, McLuhan discerned a per-
ceptual world in transition to sensuous plenitude. He argued that mental habits 
deformed and impoverished by the phonetic alphabet and typography were in an 
expansive process of  reconnecting to an electric shared cornucopia of  bodily sensa-
tion, especially the acoustic sense (McLuhan, 1964). While popularly admired as a 
possible master key to the cultural id or, at the very least, a provocative commentary 
on postwar society, the powerful message McLuhan assigned to the medium also had 
a scholarly life, primarily as the stalking horse for a paradigm I describe here as media 
structuralism. Though McLuhan was its public face, it was elaborated and developed 
by an interdisciplinary group of  twentieth-century scholars collectively persuaded 
that the historical appearance of  alphabetic inscription, especially its printed form, 
was a phase change in human civilization. Generally speaking, they agreed on the 
rough outlines of  that change.
This essay is a critical examination, here and there a ferociously critical examination, 
of  the intellectual usefulness of  that paradigm for representing the history of  media. 
Media structuralism took the history of  inscription as a seed model for understanding 
the cultural impact of  twentieth-century electronic media, especially television. 
Though inscription in all its forms was always implicated in the logic of  media struc-
turalism, alphabetic inscription in particular was examined as an instrument that, in 
rendering language abstract and detached from direct human encounter, had set 
human society down a historical path of  no return.
The engine of  the argument was the hoary old notion of  technological determin-
ism, a clumsy moniker for what turned out to be an equally clumsy claim. Everywhere 
the alphabet went, in this narrative, an irresistible logic of  form went as well. 
Alphabetic literacy as a cultural formation was said to have restructured authority 
and trust, public and ceremonial life, the social and cultural organization of  knowl-
edge, forms of  collective representation – even, in some versions, personality and 
perception. Its effect was not only on the forms of  collective life, but the shape of  
the social values these forms were said to embody. For communication studies, media 
structuralism offered something else as well: an attractive apparatus of  grand distinc-
tions for fashioning a disciplinary imperative.
In media structuralism alphabetic inscription was ground zero for looking back-
wards at the past and forward to the future. It offered a way to frame a collection of  
troubling discontents associated with modernity, and experienced as anxiety about 
the attenuation of  grounded spatial experience, the inscrutability of  technocratic 
systems of  knowledge and power, the incoherence of  a diffuse public sphere of  
imagination, the felt loss of  shared moral sensibilities, and an uneasiness that imme-
diate objects and distant demands were too insistent and evolving too quickly for the 
world to be a comfortable human place. Media structuralists differed among them-
selves about the degree to which different inscriptive forms had moved this process 
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forward, and the exact processes by which literate effects were translated into the 
lived particulars of  past and present existence. They agreed that whatever these 
transformative mechanisms were, they were both cumulative and accelerating. In 
pursuit of  their convictions, these disagreements were more ignored than addressed, 
often in the expectation that deeper scholarship would sort them out in time. 
Meanwhile, visionaries could grasp the essential historical pattern.
The most influential twentieth-century structuralists did not work under the insti-
tutional aegis of  communication, a postwar academic invention constructed from a 
patchwork of  intellectual and practical interests traditionally divided between speech 
communication and journalism instruction. The postwar period saw the gradual 
assimilation by communications programs of  questions about journalism and media 
addressed from the perspectives of  social science. This was mass communication 
effects research, which soon began to assert itself  as a powerful disciplinary para-
digm. Recent work chronicles the origin of  that tradition in the migration of  World 
War II psychological warfare research and the networks of  social scientists developed 
around it. The new approach was policy oriented, statistically savvy, and staffed by 
social scientists with the quantitative and organizational skills to secure funding and 
academic prestige. It entered a postwar educational landscape where major US uni-
versities competed for generous funding from a government that valued scientific 
expertise as an engine of  measureable social progress (Haney, 2008).
The imparting of  craft knowledge of  journalism had no grounding in systematic 
research. It responded more to professional press associations than invisible colleges 
of  scholars (Carey, 2000). From the beginning, the trainers of  journalists and the 
social scientists did not fit very comfortably together. Though both were focused on 
media, the uneasiness of  their coexistence has been noted, if  not much explored. 
Meanwhile, communication and journalism programs were swept up in the postwar 
higher education project of  constructing more rigorous academic standards across 
all disciplines, standardizing the curriculum and promoting their field in the wider 
public sphere. In the absence of  long-standing theoretical or methodological tradi-
tions with which to leverage funding or prestige, mid-century journalism programs 
seemed unable to formulate a disciplinary image legible to the larger research uni-
versity (Carey, 1978). The rhetoric they chose to defend themselves was proffered 
largely in civic and moral terms. Its message was that good journalists are key to 
producing an informed citizenry capable of  shaping a wider public sphere. Journalism 
faculty with more academic ambitions positioned themselves as ethical arbiters, 
critics and moderators of  a public debate among citizens, press, and government. 
Meanwhile, the mantra of  journalism instruction – the impossibility of  democracy 
without newspapers – was overshadowed by television in the popular imaginary, and 
in the imagination of  students. With its unapologetic glitz, mid-century’s most 
popular mass medium seemed to have little in common with the heroic world of  
journalistic ideals that were the heart of  journalistic self-presentation in the academy.
At this moment of  professional vulnerability, media structuralism offered some 
humanities-oriented communication and journalism scholars a distinctive set of  
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questions and a clear object of  inquiry. The attribution of  powerful inscriptive effects 
to whole cultures across the sweep of  human history seemed to challenge the media 
effects tradition at its very own game. More subtly, media structuralism offered a 
moral framework. It laid out a broken world that legitimated disciplinary anxieties 
in the academic workplace by linking them to a more encompassing cultural narra-
tive. In the academy’s growing embrace of  theoretical abstraction and scientific 
specialism, some communications and journalism faculty discerned an abandonment 
of  that institution’s vital responsibility to foster dialogue and debate about the great 
moral questions concerning the civic and academic realities that had come to pass 
in the postwar moment. It also explained why journalism faculty had not been wel-
comed as equal participants to the academic table. In these circles the narrative of  
literate deformation was received both as a well-timed commentary on political ten-
sions within the academy, and as a place from which to reflect on the increasing 
takeover of  the larger culture by the market and the state. Problematically, it failed 
to offer what its followers needed most. It did not provide a vision of  institutional 
expertise, a methodologically coherent research strategy for training students, or a 
topical research agenda that could stabilize and consolidate the position of  those 
communication scholars who were not part of  the tradition of  media effects.
McLuhan had none of  this in mind when he laid out the mechanism of  television 
as a perverse kind of  modernism in which function followed form. Form was the 
pixelated screen. Function was the perceptual experience it assembled. McLuhan’s 
pseudo-mathematical “ratio of  the senses,” a kind of  updated medieval system of  
bodily humors, was meant to reveal a once seamlessly integrated human sensorium 
that had been fractured by alphabetic literacy and printing (McLuhan, 1962). What 
print had torn asunder, television would reconnect. The television screen was far more 
than an agent of  shallowness and distraction. It presaged the repair of  the psychic dis-
solution that had long burdened industrial man. This coming transformation was dis-
cernible in the new electronic technologies of  knowledge and experience. A globally 
dispersed shared consciousness needed only to recognize itself  to claim its utopian 
reward: unity instead of  alienation, simultaneity instead of  fragmentation.
Though the spectacle of  an erudite literature professor ceding the future of  culture 
to television, the medium of  the commonplace and anti-intellectual, was thrilling, 
McLuhan’s koan-like, aphoristic disdain for the conventional apparatus of  scholarship 
denied him a serious academic hearing. A few weak efforts by supporters to translate 
his claims into something like identifiable social science hypotheses came to nothing. 
The culture moved on. Still, where technology had once seemed opaque and irrel-
evant, a side story to larger dramas of  politics and society, McLuhan made it prob-
lematic, revelatory, and playful. His environmental conviction that everything in 
culture is a medium in disguise that lends itself  to communicative theorizing hung 
on. He installed the idea that media do not end with their surfaces but resonate and 
connect with deeper cultural structures. Most of  all, he succeeded in linking the 
profane order of  technology to a powerful, even mystical, sense of  cultural illumina-
tion. He remained an animating presence at the University of  Toronto, which holds 
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his papers. His ideas were also significant in the work of  the media ecology program 
at New York University originated by Neil Postman. Elsewhere his influence was 
manifest at the Institute of  Communications Research at the University of  Illinois at 
Urbana Champaign in the work of  James W. Carey (1967, 1998), who paid less atten-
tion to McLuhan himself  than to the claims of  the media structuralists on whose 
ideas he had built.
The High Modernism of Alphabetic Literacy:  
Walter J. Ong
One of  the driving premises of  the cultural analysis of  modern media is the idea that 
there is a relationship between forms of  media and forms of  life. This formulation 
had no disciplinary identity in US universities before McLuhan. While his ideas were 
synthesized from an eclectic mix of  influences, the strand that is relevant here was his 
quixotic refashioning of  work by a loosely connected group of  anthropologists, lin-
guists, classicists, and one political economist. Several of  these scholars had published 
in the 1920s and 1930s. Most were contemporaries of  McLuhan himself. Like him, 
several were at different times in residence at the University of  Toronto. A fair number 
were Catholic. Though variably aware of  one another’s work in the 1960s and 1970s, 
they were less a self-identified research community than attached to a common object 
of  inquiry, namely, the history-altering effects of  alphabetic writing on human society. 
They embraced the view, contrarian for the time, that literate achievement was not 
an unqualified intellectual advance. A few believed that the price of  alphabetic literacy 
had been a profound loss of  cultural innocence. Working from various sources of  
evidence, they offered idiosyncratic and sometimes controversial readings of  the his-
torical record, and observations of  isolated tribal and rural communities conceived as 
placeholders for earlier stages of  civilizational development.
The work of  Albert B. Lord and Milman Parry on the oral-formulaic techniques 
of  Serbo-Croatian singers was foundational to their shared enterprise (Lord, 1960). 
Eric Havelock (1963, 1981) advanced a disputed thesis that the Iliad was the frozen 
snapshot of  an apparatus of  classical oral memory captured at the moment when 
the alphabet’s unique power (the linguistic wisdom of  the time) to transcribe spoken 
language had revolutionized intellectual storage. Jack Goody and Ian Watt at 
Cambridge energetically challenged the crude binary classification that divided men 
into savage or civilized, arguing that these categories misunderstood what forms of  
social organization were necessary to literate and non-literate societies (Goody & 
Watt, 1968; Goody, 1977).
On the basis of  their own studies of  inscriptive technologies and the social prac-
tices connected to them, two in this group made broad claims that the impact of  
alphabetic writing had large-scale diffuse effects that were discoverable, universal, 
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and profoundly problematic. They were Walter J. Ong, SJ, a onetime student of  
McLuhan’s at St. Louis University, and Harold Adams Innis, McLuhan’s older col-
league at the University of  Toronto. Ong discerned these effects in a somewhat 
manichean struggle between the ear and the eye for sensory dominance (Ong, 1967, 
1979). For him the structure of  consciousness flowed from repeated encounters with 
messages available to each perceptual sense. Though the historical ear captured 
human communication in the form it was meant to be, the historical eye was over-
whelmed by corrupted messages that swamped the natural faculty of  the ear. Innis 
argued that the physical properties of  messages themselves, rather than the sensory 
modalities that captured them, were reflected in the mechanisms of  societal stability 
and control. The struggle he discerned was between bureaucratic expansion fostered 
by messages that could move efficiently across space without distortion, and spiritual 
traditions of  memory in which messages could persist across time with little distor-
tion (Innis, 1991, 2007; for a useful retrospective consideration of  Innis’s work, see 
Acland & Buxton, 1999).
For both Ong and Innis, what appeared to be an analysis of  the empirical condi-
tions of  communication became an unproveable claim that a fundamental moral 
tendency was associated with different technological forms. Each employed a wholly 
modernist impulse to strip down human experience to what he perceived as its 
essential properties. Each also embraced a surprisingly anachronistic framing device: 
the old culture-stage theory of  civilizations, even then a discredited tradition for 
asserting radical and universalized shifts in human affairs over time. The arguments 
of  both theorists shared three anchoring postulates: (1) At any given historical 
moment, a “dominant” medium controls the moral, intellectual, and social character 
of  the society in which it exists. (2) The origin of  a proper kind of  human morality 
lies in acoustic speech. So does the possibility of  its renewal. (3) Acoustic speech is 
weak against alphabetic writing (and its handmaiden, electronic media).
That writing dominates speech was so obvious to Ong as to need no serious 
demonstration of  its validity as a fact. He repeatedly argued that the habits of  
acoustic speech were no match for the sheer plenitude and irresistible power 
of  written language. On the plenitude side, writing was said simply to have crowded 
out meaningful speech and taken up social real estate previously occupied by talk. 
He might have sought to establish clinching, systematic evidence in the experience of  
contemporary man – the most accessible and presumably unambiguous example 
of  this historical dynamic at work. In fact, this would not have been easy evidence 
to assemble. Would one compare time occupied with written media to time spent 
in conversation? Would a better measure be the number of  words individually chan-
neled through each medium, whatever the time spent? Should one consider the 
social importance of  messages in each mode? How to make sense of  striking differ-
ences in literate and conversational practices across social groups? Which groups? 
Might individual measures be the wrong ones? Should the focus be on institutional 
communication? Which institutions? Above all, how could one disentangle the lived 
reality that writing is thoroughly intertwined with talk, and always has been? To 
EnD TiMES For a MEDia HiSTory ParaDiGM 7
draw only the most obvious conclusion, people engage in more talk because they 
read and write, and read and write more because they talk.
Alternatively, Ong argued that the brute psychological power of  written language 
colonizes and transforms the fragile spirit of  spoken language, whatever its plenitude 
might be. This is the idea, approximately, that speech in societies dominated by 
writing isn’t the true, natural speech of  original face-to-face encounter. Ong offers 
many anecdotal examples. They include dictionary-referenced educated speech that 
in time renders socially inferior the dialect of  the neighborhood. The emblematic 
modern oral speaker is a broadcaster or politician who works from a script. Novelistic 
dialogue is an artificial facsimile of  natural speech. The inevitable logic of  his argu-
ment is to reduce all contemporary spoken language to a degraded simulation of  
authentic conversation. Even speech learned at a literate mother’s knee cannot be 
orally pristine when spoken language is demoted to a pale echo of  writing. Ong skirts 
the implication of  his argument and also does not refute it.
The justificatory theology of  Ong’s framework sheds some light on its structure. 
In The Presence of  the Word (1967) he argues that men at the origin of  human history 
communicated freely with God. This archetypal encounter created a foundational 
model for men’s relationships to one another. The spiritual necessity of  voice and 
presence was, teleologically speaking, the final cause of  the evolution of  speech. 
Writing imposed a disabling artificiality on what men were evolutionarily destined 
to be. The Fall was effectively a historical event in which inscription shattered the 
world and estranged men from God. Language that naturally exists in a dialogical 
condition of  acoustical fullness was abstracted and placed on the page. It became a 
lifeless object separable from the human beings who generated and perceived it. Thus 
was set in motion a cascade of  ever more inventive ways for men to separate them-
selves from one another while concealing from themselves what they had done. In 
Ong’s view the inscriptive abstraction that fractured the core of  human encounter 
still lies at the beating heart of  media, insidiously working against the healing and 
communion of  loving mutuality that a broken world requires. If  the spatial abstrac-
tion of  language by alphabetic inscription so irrevocably split apart something in 
human consciousness, exactly when did it take hold? Ong never names the decisive 
moment of  psychological transformation after which men became hobbled in their 
understanding of  their essential humanity. Here we pause for emphasis. If  the psy-
chological shift away from the wholeness of  experience cannot be anchored with 
historical specificity, if  such a moment cannot be unambiguously located for any 
particular group of  people, perhaps the psychological consequences of  literacy are 
neither definitive nor universal but utterly ambiguous, various, and contradictory for 
all human persons, individually and collectively – much like all human experience.
Ong’s most thorough attempt to demonstrate empirically how alphabetic literacy 
has shaped the structure of  human knowledge appears in Ramus: Method and the 
Decay of  Dialogue (1983). Based on his doctoral dissertation, it is a study of  a peda-
gogical method invented and popularized by the sixteenth-century French rhetori-
cian and educational reformer, Peter Ramus. Ong explores the Ramist strategy of  
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visualizing knowledge as a discrete object in space to be efficiently compartmental-
ized, dissected, juxtaposed, and compared to similar discrete objects. This simplifica-
tion and flattening out of  the learned tradition repudiates a person-centered 
epistemology of  rhetorically layered and sifted judgment. Ong finds evidence in 
Ramism of  an underlying psychological shift away from the traditional acoustic 
sensibility of  the rhetorical art with its appreciation of  the dramatic, the creative, 
and the poetic, and toward the cultivation of  new mental habits associated with the 
monologic, the diagrammatic, and the quantifiable. Ong also argues that the visual 
cast of  the Ramian prose style reflects the psychological experience of  a learned man 
of  his day. In this Ong may have been a victim of  the fallacy he attributes to literate 
man. He is perhaps too ready to take what is on the page for a complete reality.
It wasn’t just the moral force of  language that was weakened by alphabetic literacy 
in Ong’s view. He argued that the triumph of  the visual over the acoustic affects 
human perception of  even the phenomenal world. He contrasts the imagined psy-
chological integrity of  pre-literate aural experience with the fragmented perception 
of  the post-literate world. He frames this distinction with a physiological proof. In 
his acoustic cosmology, sound bathed pre-literate hearers non-directionally. Men felt 
themselves to be immersed in the womb of  the world (Ong, 1979). This is a peculiar 
basis on which to claim distinctions in historical states of  human experience. It is 
hard to believe that any living person exists in a world that is not phenomenologically 
perceived as immersive. An acute perception of  aural directionality is also a vital 
mode of  perceptual discrimination at least some of  the time for everyone, and not 
only for modern navigators of  urban streets. Skilled hunter-gatherers would have 
depended heavily on it. The point of  Ong’s contrast is to argue that visual experience 
puts viewers at a perceptual and, therefore, psychological distance from what they 
behold. This claim must puzzle anyone who has ever been lost in the face of  the 
beloved, or utterly absorbed in a stunningly beautiful landscape, a traumatic scene, 
a good book.
Pre-literate hearing man was seeing man as well. Some fancy footwork is neces-
sary, then, to explain away the obvious delight in visual experience we may attribute 
to the creators of  the skilled and beautiful designs of  material artifacts left to us from 
ancient and traditional cultures. Acute vision must always have been critical both to 
the survival and the aesthetic pleasures of  the human species. Though different per-
ceptual skills may be honed for the needs of  different historical times and places, 
there are no grounds to believe that hearing was the premier perceptual sense of  
people in settlements without writing (or that it makes any sense to compare the 
modalities of  ear and eye hierarchically). It is obvious that the visual objects men 
attend to vary by time and place, but Ong’s claim that the most typical visual experi-
ence of  literate worlds is inscriptive is difficult to credit.
If  alphabetic literacy dominates modern visual experience, and modern visual 
experience dominates all other sensory modalities, then it must dominate touch 
itself, which accompanies our ever-present situatedness in the world. Ong contrasts 
what he believes is the relatively more impoverished visual experience of  alphabetic 
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cultures with the presumed perceptual richness of  pre-literate existence. Did he mean 
there is less visual variety in modern life, or that we ignore extant visual variety in 
order to read? Did he find cities to be less visually variegated than natural landscapes? 
Here the point at issue cannot be writing as such. It is a claim about the poverty of  
even the most elaborate human artifactual creations stacked up against nature’s 
fecundity. If  human worlds are full to the brim with visual experience in all historical 
conditions, what can it mean for the ratio of  the senses to shift historically? For the 
perceptual “load” to be different from one culture to another? What is the proper 
ratio of  sensory experience for human beings? What best suits the forest? The savan-
nah? The tundra?
And yet Ong also allows that writing has been necessary to the full development 
of  human consciousness. This concession seems to give the game away. If  evolution-
ary orality may flourish only at the cost of  intellectual development, it can hardly be 
a totalizing ideal for communication among men living in time. In light of  this admis-
sion, Ong (1982) undertakes to reframe his analytical goal as simply laying out the 
affordances and tendencies of  the range of  available communicative modes. Just as 
there is a natural balance of  the senses, he proposes the possibility of  a cultural 
balance between writing and speech. It is hard to imagine what this might be, given 
his previous arguments. It is curious that while writing has been able to historically 
amplify and elaborate its power, speech has lacked this capacity. It is more threatened 
than ever by what he labels the secondary orality of  electronic media with its decep-
tive illusion of  intimacy and dependence on literate technology to exist at all. Since 
speech remains impotent, literate psychology remains unredeemed.
Particularly problematic is Ong’s claim that some groups living among literates 
in the twentieth century have maintained living contact with pristine orality. To 
explain the persistent failure of  minority students in the United States to achieve 
parity in educational achievement with their majority-group peers, Ong (1979) 
invokes the “highly oral culture of  our black urban ghettoes” (p. 4). He diagnoses an 
educational disparity as a clash of  “residual” orality with the literate world of  school-
ing. More than a century after the end of  the slave trade, he seems to propose that 
African Americans are psychologically wedded to the tribal orality of  their ancestors, 
impervious to the contemporary literate blanket surrounding them. Leaving aside 
the faulty assumption of  a unified “African” oral tradition, and the failure to account 
for this striking survival of  this oral sensibility in spite of  the disappearance of  so 
many other features of  a pre-literate African heritage, the underlying point is worth 
our notice. There are pockets of  escape from literacy after all. “Nor is orality ever 
completely eradicable; reading a text oralizes it” (Ong, 1982). If  print is oralizeable, 
what possible grounds are left for driving a psychological wedge between writing 
and speech?
Indeed, Ong never seriously addressed how the orally pristine might sustain 
themselves, or how contemporary communities might develop their own oral 
traditions in a larger typographic milieu. The point allows us to consider how 
literacy itself  is diffused. Must literate skill be individually acquired to work its 
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consciousness-transforming effects? Is living in a world of  literate conventions – 
time stamps and train schedules, driver’s licenses, tax forms and street signs – enough 
to inculcate a so-called literate psychology? Is literate-mindedness, whatever this may 
be, wholly transmitted by social imitation and not at all by the visual abstractions of  
language and sensory specialization? Does the achievement of  cultural literate-
mindedness require the attainment of  reading and writing skills by some critical mass 
of  the population? Do adults with poor literacy skills really have habits of  thinking 
that differ fundamentally from those of  their literate fellows? Or do they lack access 
to specific social networks and timely information?
The End of the Great Divide
To summarize: The text of  Ongian structuralism is a mechanism that evacuates from 
spoken language an acoustically conveyed morality that is the essence of  spoken 
language. This loss of  dialogic mutuality estranges literates from the phenomenal 
world and other men. We may think of  this brief  statement as the kernel of  the 
tragic narrative of  the so-called Great Divide hypothesis. Once prevalent in educa-
tional and cognitive psychology circles, the Great Divide proposes in its most basic 
form that literacy is the signal cognitive acquisition that makes higher-order abstract 
thought possible. In addition to the tragic vision of  media structuralism, there is 
an ameliorative version of  the Great Divide as well. Literacy acquisition is the condi-
tion of  sophisticated technological progress, and the essential tool of  an informed 
democracy.
To assess the root claim of  the claim that literacy is an essential prerequisite for 
abstract thought, the social psychologists Sylvia Scribner and David Cole (1981) 
undertook a seven-year ethnographic and experimental study of  literates and non-
literates in a small area of  Liberia in the 1970s. They chose their field site for the 
fortuitous fact that three different scripts were locally taught using distinctive pedago-
gies. Arabic script was the medium of  instruction in Qur’anic schools. Romanized 
script was taught in English schools. A locally invented Vai script was taught infor-
mally by some adults to other adults. Most students typically learned only one kind 
of  script. This meant that Scribner and Cole were able to measure and compare the 
cognitive skills of  each group of  script literates. They also measured the cognitive 
skills of  literates and non-literates across a range of  cognitive domains. These 
included abstract thinking, taxonomic categorization, memory, logical reasoning, 
and reflective knowledge about language. These data were supplemented by ethno-
graphic observation and extended surveys of  family and occupational histories, and 
of  attitudes associated with modernity. Unglamorously but importantly, they learned 
that different styles of  literate instruction cultivate different cognitive skills. The tasks 
that students excelled at were exactly the cognitive tasks they were trained for. These 
cognitive tasks were related to the practical functions each kind of  script performed 
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in Vai society. There was also no Great Divide. That is, there were no statistically 
significant differences in the capacities of  literates and non-literates to succeed at 
abstract thinking tasks. The belief  that oral man is captured within a shell of  con-
creteness he cannot peck his way out of  to some higher-order level of  thinking was 
heartily disproved.
There was one weak effect that is richly ironic in this context. Literates were a 
little better than non-literates at talking about the structure of  language and literacy. 
In addition, schooled English literacy affected some social relationships among its 
practitioners, in ways that schooled Qur’anic and non-schooled Vai literacy did not, 
by offering access to bodies of  knowledge outside those locally circulated. This was 
so even though the amount of  time all groups had spent in urban areas was not 
significantly different. Since girls did not attend school, gender was the single attribute, 
decidedly a non-cognitive one, reliably associated with the possession of  literate skill. 
The point was that the sources of  intellectual achievement are found in cultural and 
social circumstances, and not in cognitive capacities transformatively tied to literacy 
acquisition. So where are we? If  it is the case that shifts in communication technology 
do not kick new psychological processes into gear through a process of  inculcating 
literate-mindedness, perhaps these technologies steer social processes in powerful 
ways. This was the argument Harold A. Innis developed, and to whose work we 
now turn.
Media Structuralism in its Laocoön (Mannerist) 
Phase: Innis
Commenting on Innis’s account of  communication technology as a shaping force in 
human history for a special issue of  the Journal of  Canadian Studies, his biographer 
A. John Watson (1977) points to an iconicized, technologically determinist Innis (pp. 
45–46). This was the Innis whose bold theoretical claims about societal character 
anchored in the physical properties of  message decay made him a key figure within 
a certain strain of  media studies. This media structuralist Innis is often contrasted 
with a second persona. This was the political economist whose scholarship about the 
Canadian fur trade and cod fisheries produced a much admired theory of  economic 
relations between metropole and hinterland. The iconicized, structuralist Innis had 
a more sweeping point of  view. He laid out a world-scale drama of  technological 
contenders in a continuing confrontation between the spiritual tenacity of  inward-
looking religious tradition and the present-mindedness of  secular expansion across 
territory. He pitted the comparatively effortless movement of  messages across dis-
tance by media like paper, papyrus, and radio against less mobile forms like parch-
ment, stone, and oral tradition. He believed their durability made them rich in their 
power to conserve memory. (A small point: Parchment is sturdier than paper, but 
not much heavier to move. Nomadic oral cultures traveling across space were hardly 
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unusual. Countless pre-literate groups that stayed put proved rather more fragile 
than Innis’s schema suggests.)
It would be reassuring to conclude that the formulized Innis sketched above was 
a caricature of  the real thing, but it is hard to do with much conviction. Empire and 
Communications (2007) and The Bias of  Communication (1991) together present the 
basic framework. In them, Innis wraps up Western history and a little more in less 
than 300 pages. Empire starts with early writing and proceeds through Egypt, Greece, 
Rome, medieval Europe, Islam, and the printing press. Bias repeats parts of  that nar-
rative and lays out nineteenth- and twentieth-century Anglophone publishing with a 
glancing take on radio and telegraphy. In so compressed an itinerary, even Innis’s 
most sympathetic readers have little to fall back on but the highly abstract engine of  
space-time oscillation in which “biases” toward present-mindedness or tradition-
mindedness swing back and forth in history. These arise from the physical portability 
or durability of  whatever media instantiate and so “dominate” a given society’s pre-
vailing systems of  knowledge and authority. Sooner or later a challenger with the 
contrary bias rises up and displaces its dominant predecessor in processes that Innis 
never deeply details. He created no conceptual architecture at all to mediate between 
his abstract matrix and the slightly mad chronicle of  unsorted facts he offered to 
shore it up. A series of  breathless historical assertions and propositions unrolls in the 
texts of  Empire and Bias, their connecting inferences frequently incomplete or elided. 
Their author disposes of  vast time scales in a few sentences. Great clumps of  political 
and historical complexity are rendered in abbreviated narratives with little discussion. 
He is contradictory. His inattention to underlying social processes makes it difficult 
to follow, much less evaluate, his conclusions. In the absence of  a conceptual lan-
guage to order his staccato breviary of  fact, his claims are at once too abstract and 
too particular. His work offers none of  the rich expansiveness of  articulation that is 
fundamental to historical explanation. This is probably why both books were scarcely 
reviewed in economic and history journals at publication and received only a handful 
of  notices in political economy journals, even in Canada where Innis remains an 
intellectual national hero.
The opacity of  Innis’s prose is legendary. It is hard to pick an excerpt that illustrates 
this in a short space; the following sample may suffice. It references the United States 
during the Great Depression, a topic that most readers will find more familiar than 
the ancient civilizations that mostly occupied his concern. Its relative abundance of  
detail is atypical since Innis was wont to summarize the character of  whole societies 
in a phrase. Of  the 1930s United States he writes:
The highly sensitive economy built up in relation to newsprint and its monopoly posi-
tion in relation to advertising hastened an emphasis on a new medium, notably the 
radio, which in turn contributed to a large-scale depression. The radio was accompa-
nied by political change in the return of  the Democratic party to power and the election 
of  F. D. Roosevelt who claimed that “nothing would help him more than to have the 
newspapers against him.” Localization of  metropolitan newspapers in the United States 
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was accompanied by weeklies and digests which provided a common denominator 
from a national rather than a metropolitan point of  view. Illustrated papers and the 
radio responded to the demands of  advertising for national coverage. The radio empha-
sized a lowest common denominator with profound effects on music. The significance 
of  mechanization in print, photographs including the cinema, phonographs including 
the talkies, and radio has been evident in literature, art, and music. The pressure of  
mechanization on words has been reflected in simplified spelling and an interest in 
semantics. The limitations of  words have led to resort to architecture and the rise of  
skyscrapers as an advertising medium. In North America, in contrast with Great Britain 
and Europe, the book was subordinated to the newspaper. Mechanization involved an 
emphasis on best-sellers and the creation of  a gap of  unintelligibility of  more artistic 
literary works. . . . If  civilization may be measured by the tolerance of  unintelligibility, 
its capacities are weakened by monopolies of  knowledge built up in the same political 
area using the same language. (Innis, 2007, pp. 162–163)
For this paragraph (from which several sentences addressing the history of  publica-
tion are removed) Innis cites the following anecdotal sources: H. L. Mencken, 
The American Language (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1936); Q. D. Leavis, Fiction and the 
Reading Public (London: Chatto & Windus, 1932); L. L. Schucking, The Sociology of  
Literary Taste (London: K. Paul, Trench, 1944); D. L. Cohn, The Good Old Days (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1940); E. Haldeman Julius, The First Hundred Million 
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1928).
Without clearly committing himself, Innis suggests that the collapse of  newspaper 
advertising was a serious factor in the Great Depression. He makes no effort to 
compare it to more significant collapses in farm commodity prices, automobile sales, 
steel purchases, or housing. Did newspapers really elect FDR, his well-known quip 
notwithstanding, or did voters respond to the brutal immediacy of  their circum-
stances? Reliable estimates of  how many advertising dollars would have gone to 
newspapers in the absence of  radio are notoriously difficult to establish. He fails 
to elaborate on what it means if  radio content was driven by national advertising, or 
what content this was. He attributes a “national” point of  view to media and their 
audiences without supporting detail while gesturing vaguely in the direction of  its 
significance. The “profound” effects of  radio on music remain unstated. Architecture 
as advertising invites questions about whether steel and concrete, like stone, count 
as time-biased media relative to “words.”
Cultural decline seems a less helpful explanation for why US newspaper readers 
outnumbered book readers than the cheaper price of  newspapers and the modest 
literacy skills of  an expanding immigrant population. What we should conclude 
about a rising rate of  newspaper consumption (at a time when rates of  mass market 
book sales were also increasing, if  not so spectacularly), he doesn’t say. We are forced 
to guess what he means (probably nothing good) by claiming the books were “sub-
ordinated” to newspapers. Does the popularity of  bestsellers really explain resistance 
to “more artistic literary works?” His final sentence seems to attribute intellectual and 
cultural openness to multilingual societies, though we cannot be sure. The troubling 
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proposition that “civilization” is weakened by monolinguism follows from a premise 
barely elaborated. Nor does he pick up and expand on this comment elsewhere in 
the chapter in which it appears. The point is not to throw stones at Innis’s style so 
much as to demonstrate his pattern of  leaving key assertions and arguments unde-
veloped in relation both to specific historical information and whatever larger 
cultural conclusions he hoped to draw.
We should be troubled by his methodological rigor. Innis never tells us how it is 
that whole cultures can be properly described as having a single “bias.” Did he work 
backward from independently observed attributes in each society of  interest to dis-
cover that its major (by what criterion?) media were those with exactly the biases 
associated with those attributes? On what grounds did he dismiss (or examine) the 
relative effects of  other-biased media existing in the same time-space? Is his definition 
of  media inclusive enough? His argument is disappointingly circular. He asserts that 
the materiality of  durability and portability in selected media may be understood as 
proof  of  societal dispositions toward conservation or expansion.
What if, over time, previously durable and portable media acquire capacities they 
may not have had before? In her history of  the impact of  printing, Elizabeth Eisenstein 
(1979) argues that paper and printing together created new and powerful cultural 
memory. What we call the quattrocento Renaissance, she says, was a cultural flower-
ing we know about mostly because it was preserved on printed paper. Previously, the 
memory of  cultural achievements had been relatively more ephemeral, subject to 
decimation and erasure by epidemics, wars, and other disasters. Their successors 
struggled to recover, or were unaware of, the ground that had been lost. Printing 
reversed this process. Duplication in large quantities made unprecedented levels of  
written content effectively permanent even in the face of  social catastrophe. Earlier 
content had no comparable hope of  survival. Parchment, though sturdier, could not 
be produced in quantity. This made it altogether more fragile and less time-binding 
than printed paper, Innis’s argument to the contrary notwithstanding. Printed paper 
was both a premier medium for extending messages in space, and the default medium 
for modern memory as well.
Digital communication, our contemporary medium of  transmission par excellence, 
has a similarly impressive history of  elaborating and transforming its spatial bias. We 
know its earliest electrical forms as telegraphy, telephony, and radio, all memory-less 
modes by Innis’s lights. Over a century and a half  these have morphed into a startling 
profusion of  capacities and forms. Its development of  unprecedentedly expanded 
reservoirs of  memory poses challenges as dramatic and destabilizing, and opportuni-
ties as remarkable, as those from rapidly expanding multi-channel transmission 
across space. The conceptual point is that the applications, affordances, and obstacles 
posed by media are unpredictable and never fixed, even in their earliest manifesta-
tions. Their engagement with the cultures that produce them is never rigidly fixed.
Can we really believe that time-biased societies usually have no driving interest in 
present goings-on, the very definition of  spatial bias? How do we know that the 
authority structures of  so-called memory-minded societies are actually decentral-
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ized? Among societies with little history of  territorial expansion, we may be reluctant 
to concur that this has more to do with the nature of  their media systems than with 
a lack of  technological or economic capacity for aggressiveness; or, conversely, to a 
fortunate command of  natural and economic resources satisfying to a domestic 
population, or, further, to political calculations and arrangements that make aggres-
sion unthinkable and costly. To soften the rigidity of  his time-space matrix, Innis 
offers a compromise position for anomalies that are too obvious to ignore. Empire 
and political stability are said to be markers of  a balance (the criterion is unclear) 
between time-binding and space-binding media in some societies. (On other occa-
sions the term “empire” refers to a civilization-destroying, unrestrained spatial bias 
working its will.) There is a whiff  in this confusion of  a self-referential logic entangled 
in its own concepts and unmanageably arbitrary in its application to historical details.
Though technology has often been conceived as an instrument for progressively 
rendering space ever weaker in its ability to influence communicative exchange, the 
cosmology of  media structuralism invested space with an aggressive and sinister 
vitality. In the abstract, compressed space of  the page, Ong saw depersonalization 
and the shattering of  human relations. In the leap of  messages across distance, Innis 
saw bureaucratic centralism, the implementation of  force, and the crushing of  tradi-
tion. If  space is a villain and memory a virtue, and the history of  the West is mostly 
an obsession with space and a disrespect for time, as Innis argues, there is a paradox 
in his prescription for the West to pay attention to its past. What past would he 
recuperate? Surely nostalgia must be reckoned a vice as great as distance in the media 
structuralist cosmos. That human flourishing is often choked by tradition is plain, 
just as there are liberating, even ennobling possibilities in hopping across territory. 
The equation of  spatiality with the tyranny of  imperialism is no more defensible 
than the equation of  temporality with the tyranny of  revelation. Structurally speak-
ing, remote, non-accountable control of  distant territory is no more obviously inhu-
mane than the sedimented brutality of  racism or the oppression of  women, forms 
of  cultivated memory both.
Give Innis credit. He had a global sense of  human history and a deep intuition of  
the perils of  spreading technocratic systems. He saw that entities on the scale of  
nations and civilizations are complex assemblages of  material and expressive ele-
ments, though this Deleuzian mode of  analysis was not available to him for concep-
tualizing large, interactive agglomerations coalescing and dissolving across space, and 
producing, in time, other entities altogether. No genuinely emergent properties 
unfold in the just-so stories that constitute Innis’s narrative. There is only the hydrau-
lic opposition of  tradition to the tireless advance of  the market and industrialism, 
the whole too abstract to capture the deeper complexities of  social change. One 
imagines Innis stacking fact upon alleged fact pulled from a patchwork of  secondary 
sources of  varying quality in a great Baconian pile of  statements from which, added 
up, the truth of  societal change would somehow emerge.
Though he positioned historical change as at the level of  society and not psyche, 
Innis was very much in synch with the psychological structuralists. His monopolies 
16 Carolyn Marvin
of  knowledge and their associated biases run parallel to notions about literate domi-
nance. He, too, invests dialogue with singular virtue. He, too, sees history as a nar-
rative of  the advancing spatialization of  language and thought. He looks back 
nostalgically on human societies centuries removed (Athens and Byzantium for him; 
pre-literate humanity for Ong) and proclaims their lifeworlds to have been morally 
balanced. Of  the complex morphologies of  war and peace and politics, of  natural 
resources and social classes, of  countless other factors critical for assessing the “impli-
cations of  the media of  communication for the character of  knowledge,” he had too 
little to say (Innis, 1991, p. 3).
What was his aim? In Bias he called for the revival of  “effective vital discussion” 
and a recognition “on the part of  the universities that teachers and students are still 
living and human” (1991, p. 32). He believed that universities with their ancient 
traditions of  dialogue and philosophical inquiry had become extensions of  the 
market and the state. He hoped to explain the long tale of  history that had brought 
the West to such a state by exploring how its forms of  media reflected its forms of  
life. This was a visionary question in the 1950s, unacknowledged in conventional 
historiography. The ambition of  his undertaking and the inadequacy of  the concep-
tual tools he invented should be viewed against that background. Still, we can fairly 
ask how his efforts to render the instrumentalities of  thought visible as objects for 
investigation and concern stacked up against the received historical explanations he 
hoped to show were radically incomplete. Did he transform any established narra-
tives or points of  view? In fact, he took on no traditional periodizations, disputed no 
mid-range historical theories, clarified no ambiguous historical facts. He resolved 
no existing historical debates. At best, he mounted a parallel narrative that, lacking 
in significant historical depth, failed to demonstrate the essential connection, if  it 
was there, between the intellectual and political cultures of  the societies that inter-
ested him and their forms of  media.
Still, he anticipated what is today a thoroughly self-conscious preoccupation of  
social theory. This is the problem of  how to construct theoretical models able to 
describe the shifting and overlapping relationships of  the global and the local mani-
fest in large, technological systems running through the resilient complexity and 
creativity of  realized life. That his schema should have failed is not surprising. Both 
the scale of  the attempt and the lack of  available data for exploring the questions 
that interested him made a genuinely illuminating account of  how media are embed-
ded in the shape of  the world impossible to produce.
One thinks of  remarkable examples of  recent historical work he would have loved 
that are far closer to the spirit of  his inquiry than his fatally simplified space-time 
matrix. Among them is Michael Clanchy’s (1979) discussion of  the adoption of  
writing by the court administrators of  Norman England from the eleventh century 
forward, their uncertain groping toward bureaucratic record keeping and retrieval, 
the clash with orally based proofs of  real property, and the struggle of  new literate 
conventions of  law with older legal forms of  social trust. Or Carlo Ginzburg’s (1980) 
study of  a stubborn sixteenth-century French miller who confounded local authori-
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ties by making cunning use of  his new literate skills and limited formal knowledge. 
Or Gerald Strauss’s (1978) account of  an ill-fated experiment by sixteenth-century 
Lutheran reformers to indoctrinate the young in the catechism and other religious 
texts with an extensive regimen of  oral and literate protocols and an elaborate system 
of  evaluation that showed them the failure of  their efforts. Or James C. Scott’s (1998) 
account of  how in nineteenth-century Germany the axe and the surveying text were 
welded into a powerful system to transform the forest into a machine for producing 
tax revenue, which collapsed from this catastrophic simplification of  its ecosystem a 
century later. More recently, he would have been interested in the debate between 
Elizabeth Eisenstein and Adrian Johns on whether printing had a determinative role 
in the early modern rise of  science, or whether it was only a palimpsest on which 
cultural habits and constructions were played out (Eisenstein, 2002a, 2002b; Johns, 
1998, 2002).
Innis’s grand narrative of  communication history did not turn out to be of  great 
interest to subsequent generations of  historians or political economists. This reflected 
its shortcomings as well as a more general retreat from grand theory in the social 
sciences and humanities, the rise of  a more fine-grained interpretive turn, and new 
fashions of  conceptualizing power. Some of  the most fruitful recent work in social 
theory has pursued what is now called the spatial turn as the old grand theories have 
morphed into new paradigms: network theory, globalization theory, assemblage 
theory. These worry about connectivity and messiness in space, not its determinist 
depersonalized footprint.
What was the Structuralist Appeal?
Where Innis’s historical narrative of  communication technology did have purchase 
was in the field of  communication studies, though he may have been more often 
invoked than closely read. The most persuasive incarnation of  his space-time 
schema is arguably James W. Carey’s well-known essay “A Cultural Approach to 
Communication” (1975). As generations of  students know, it contrasts a “ritual 
view” of  communication concerned with the maintenance of  society in time with 
a “transmission view” associated with the extension of  knowledge and control 
across territory. Innis’s spirit shows up in other work as well. It includes Josh 
Meyrowitz’s No Sense of  Place (1985), on how media foster a contemporary sense 
of  rootlessness, and Neil Postman’s Amusing Ourselves to Death (1985), a cautionary 
tale about the baneful influence of  television.
In the 1980s a flood of  new work by historians on early modern Europe began to 
examine that era’s multiple cultures of  literate and oral practices in rich detail and 
with considerable conceptual inventiveness and complexity. Never favored in profes-
sional historical circles, media structuralism found itself  thoroughly eclipsed. We 
now return to a consideration of  why communication scholars dreamed of  locating 
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its lasting development within the field of  media studies. That significant hopes were 
invested in it as a paradigmatic alternative to research on media effects can be seen 
in James W. Carey’s (1992) estimation of  the work of  Harold Innis as the “great 
achievement of  communications on this continent” that had “rescued communica-
tions from a branch of  social psychology and freed it from a reliance on natural 
science models” (p. 142). This hopeful prediction was offered as an imagined correc-
tive to the field’s relentless present-mindedness. If  McLuhan had made the cultural 
framing of  media effects thinkable, he had offered no useable mode of  analysis. Still, 
he drew attention to a body of  work that did seem to offer a suitably weighty, ready-
made historical foundation hatched in academically reliable ways whose authors 
urged its relevance to the unfolding media moment.
Evidence for the claims of  media structuralism was drawn from societies that 
existed long before the nineteenth century in places other than North America, and 
from scattered field investigations. Such work had no precedent and could have no 
future in communications programs. Lacking specialist training in both the relevant 
historical background and primary source materials that constituted the evidential 
bedrock of  media structuralism, communication scholars found themselves in no 
position to substantively refine, amplify, or critically review its claims – that is, to 
conduct the hard intellectual work that keeps scholarly knowledge vital and produc-
tive. This did not stop them from using it to authorize their own perspectives on the 
state of  contemporary media and society. As it turned out, the one-variable, two-
variable logic of  media structuralism was not so different at its core from the effects 
tradition from which it claimed to depart. It may have felt familiar to its followers, 
immersed in the intellectual atmosphere and logic of  media effect. Nor can the wield-
ing of  a shiny intellectual instrument, suggestive without being wholly clear, bol-
stered by erudite reference, be altogether discounted. What were taken to be the 
canonic texts of  media structuralism were gathered into a useable past, an argument 
from authority.
Media structuralism answered to a deeply felt disciplinary imperative to construct 
a qualitative, non-experimental account of  the power of  media to shape not attitudes 
and perceptions, but whole cultures, even eras. In the context of  communication 
studies, its root metaphor was especially apt. Technology as the privileged conceptual 
form of  media favored in this approach seemed as solid as Dr. Johnson’s table. The 
link from technology to moral and social meaning may have seemed equally unam-
biguous. Even the categories by which communications programs divided them-
selves up – speech, press, radio, television – authorized its aura of  empirical 
substantiality as an antidote to the squishy impressionism of  qualitative studies in 
the competitive politics of  academic life.
Beyond their hopes of  establishing a paradigm that might usefully serve a new 
vision of  the field of  communication, the followers of  media structuralism aimed to 
enrich the intellectual resources of  that field, and broaden, in the best liberal arts 
tradition, the range of  important questions it could weigh in on. Its contributions 
might have been more lasting if  those to whom media structuralism appealed with 
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the greatest force had been more thoughtful, even in the absence of  specialist knowl-
edge, about its animating premises, both its clumsy and rigid notion of  media domi-
nance and its mystified phenomenology of  sensory experience. These and other 
premises went virtually uncriticized. Media structuralism inhabited a moment when 
a strategic search for disciplinary identity was resolved by substituting a deeply felt 
moral agenda for the work of  scholarly investigation that could have made that 
agenda a better fit and allowed it to speak more usefully to a larger scholarly and 
public audience. It did stretch the imagination of  the field, introduced new 
and searching questions about how to think about the role of  communication in 
contemporary society, and laid sympathetic ground for the time when what is now 
broadly called cultural studies was able to more successfully broaden the field beyond 
the quantitative project of  media studies. In retrospect, it stands as the unclaimed 
freight of  communication theory, now a musty box of  curiosities, witness to a lost 
way of  looking at the world.
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